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Abstract: We document the response of the individual components of the Producer Price 
Index (PPI) to commonly used measures of monetary shocks, and show that these 
responses are at variance with many widely-used “macro” models of monetary non-
neutrality.  Monetary shocks are shown to have large relative price effects, resulting in an 
increase in the dispersion of the cross-section distribution of prices.  Furthermore, in 
response to a contractionary (expansionary) monetary shock, a substantial number of 
prices tend to rise (fall).  Most of the existing models of monetary nonneutrality are not 
capable of replicating these types of relative price responses. 
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* This paper was originally prepared for the November 2002 meetings of the Southern Economic 
Association.  The authors thank their discussant, Patrick Crowley, and seminar participants at Notre Dame 
University for helpful comments.  The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily 
reflect the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas or the Federal Reserve System. 1. Introduction. 
  Explaining the sources of monetary non-neutrality remains one of the great 
challenges of macroeconomics. There is a large body of evidence that suggests that 
changes in the nominal stock of money may have significant effects on the real economy 
in the short run. What remains controversial is the mechanism whereby these non-
neutralities arise. On the one hand, it is argued that nominal wage or price rigidity of the 
sort emphasized by Keynes plays a key role. This idea has been explored extensively in 
recent research literature, with Goodfriend and King (1998) proposing a New 
Neoclassical Synthesis that combines insights from the real business cycle literature with 
Calvo (1983) style price setting to develop a framework for thinking about for monetary 
policy affects the real economy. An alternative strand of the recent literature eschews 
exogenously given wage and price rigidity, and instead argues that limited participation 
in financial markets is the key to understanding the real effects of money. Papers include 
Lucas (1990), Fuerst (1992), Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), and more recently 
Alvarez and Kehoe (2002), Alvarez, Lucas and Weber (2001). A third strand of the 
recent literature has revived the idea of imperfect information as a source of 
nonneutrality. Models of this sort were pioneered by Lucas (1972) but the early variants 
proved less than satisfactory as accounts of persistent responses of real activity to 
nominal shocks. The newer models of Woodford (2003) and Mankiw and Reis (2002), 
for example, emphasize the importance of interaction between price setters with 
imperfect information about current economic conditions. 
  Our objective in this paper is to examine how the apparent non-neutralities of 
money are reflected in relative price movements.  First, at its “microeconomic core” the 
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react to purely monetary shocks (say by changing their consumption or labor supply 
decisions), then these changes would be reflected in relative price changes.  
Alternatively, relative price changes brought about by monetary shocks would also 
induce economic agents to alter their “real” behavior.  Either way, real effects of 
monetary shocks would manifest themselves in relative price changes.   
Second, examining the response of relative prices to monetary shocks may shed 
some light on alternative theories of monetary neutrality.  For example, there is a 
literature that has documented the positive correlation between the mean of the cross-
section distribution of price changes (aggregate inflation) and the skewness of this 
distribution.  Ball and Mankiw (1995) have argued this positive correlation is consistent 
with menu cost pricing.  On the other hand, Balke and Wynne (2001) have shown that 
flexible price models with sectoral interactions but money neutrality are also capable 
generating positive mean-skewness correlations.  Where these models are likely to differ 
with respect to their predictions about price behavior is in the response of relative prices 
to purely monetary shocks. Similarly, one might expect that a nominal shock that is fully 
perceived would have very different implications for the pattern of relative price changes 
in an environment where firms are only allowed to change prices infrequently that would 
a comparably sized, but imperfectly perceived, shock in an environment where price 
changes are frequent.  
  In this paper, we examine the response of over 600, 8-digit level producer price 
indices to a “monetary shock”.  From these individual responses, the response of the 
entire cross-section distribution of prices can be constructed.  What is evident from these 
  2responses is that monetary disturbances have substantial relative price effects.  Not only 
is the mean of the cross-section distribution affected (as would be in the case of monetary 
neutrality), but also the dispersion of the cross-section distribution is substantially 
affected.  Furthermore, the relative price effects are quite dramatic in the sense that in 
absolute terms, not just in relative terms, some prices rise and other prices fall.  Like 
Barth and Ramey (2001), we find that a contractionary monetary shock tends to raise a 
substantial number of prices in the short-run.  This suggests that the so-called price 
puzzle is prevalent in even very disaggregated price indices.  At longer horizons, we find 
that the preponderance of prices fall in response to a contractionary monetary shock.  
Finally, we argue that simple “macro” models of relative price movements such as Lucas’ 
1972 paper or the more recent sticky-price or sticky information models are unlikely to 
generate the dramatic response of the cross-section distribution of price to monetary 
shocks observed in the data.   
  This paper is closely related to the recent paper by Bils, Klenow and Kryvtsov 
(2003). Bils, Klenow and Kryvtsov examine the response of the components of the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) to standard measures of monetary shocks. They classify 
prices as flexible or sticky based on the frequency with which they change, and show that 
contrary to what we might expect, the prices of flexible goods tend to decline relative to 
the prices of sticky goods in response to an expansionary monetary shock. This finding is 
robust across different measures of monetary policy shocks, and across different 
subsamples.  
 
  32. Data preliminaries 
Our primary source of data was monthly changes in the components of the PPI 
over the period 1959:1 to 2001:12. The indexes that make up the PPI are grouped 
according to various classification structures, the three most important of which are the 
industry, commodity and stage of processing. We use primarily the commodity 
classification, which organizes products by similarity of end use or material composition. 
The All Commodities PPI consists of fifteen major commodity groupings at the 2-digit 
level (for example, “01-Farm products”, “02-Processed foods and feeds” and so on). 
These major commodity groupings are further disaggregated into subgroups at the 3-digit 
level (for example “011-Fresh and Dry Fruits, Vegetables and Nuts”, “012-Grains” etc.), 
product classes at the 4-digit level (for example “0111-Fresh Fruits and Melons”, “0113-
Fresh and Dry Vegetables” etc.), subproduct classes at the 6-digit level (for example, 
“011101-Citrus Fruits”, “011102-Other Fruits and Berries” etc.), and individual items at 
the 8-digit level (for example “01110101-Grapefruits”, “01110104-Lemons” etc.). The 
number of price series at the 2-digit level of aggregation is 14 for most of the sample 
period, increasing to 15 from 1969 on. At the highest (8-digit) level of disaggregation the 
number of series increases from 130 or so in 1959 to 1228 in 2001.  It is possible to get 
price data at an even more disaggregated level, but only at the cost of frequent breaks in 
the price series: PPI disclosure rules prohibit the reporting of prices in an industrial 
category of there are fewer than three usable price quotes in that category (see U.S. 
Department of Labor (1997), p. 136).   
In this paper, we focus on the cross-section distribution of log differences of 8-
digit level PPI price indices.  Because some price indices are available for only a limited 
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least 172 observations.  This leaves 616 price series of suitable length although not all of 
these series are available for the entire period.  The number of available price series rise 
from 122 in 1959:1 to 616 in 2001:12. 
Figure 1 plots the (smoothed) cross-section distribution of the sample averages of 
the 616 price change series.
1  These price changes are one-month changes in the 
logarithm of the individual 8-digit PPIs from 1959 through 2001.  We take this 
distribution as representing the something like a steady-state cross-section distribution of 
price changes.  For reference, we also plot a normal distribution that has the same mean 
and variance as this cross-section distribution of price changes.  One of the characteristics 
of this cross-section distribution is that it negatively skewed and very leptokurtotic.  
Figure 2 shows the various moments of the cross-section distribution of price 
changes over time. As evident from the figure, there is substantial variability in these 
summary statistics over the sample.  Some of the variability is the result of changes in the 
number of price indices available.  In particular, the number of price indices available 
increases from around 200 in 1980 to over 530 in 1984, and this gives rise to dramatic 
changes in the level of the variance, skewness, and kurtosis.  Further, there is a 
substantial decline the time-variability of the mean of the cross-section distribution over 
this period as well.  Despite the change in coverage over the sample, the unweighted 
mean of the distribution does the track broad movements in aggregate inflation over this 
period reasonably well, capturing the acceleration of inflation in the 1970s and the 
subsequent deceleration in the 1980s and 1990s. 
                                                 
1   The distribution of price changes is smoothed using the Epanechnikov kernel in RATS. 
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3.  Identifying Monetary Shocks 
We are interested in characterizing the effects of pure monetary policy shocks on 
the cross-section distribution of prices. To measure these shocks we employ a standard 
VAR methodology of the sort employed in much of the recent monetary policy literature 
(see for example Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) and Barth and Ramey 
(2001)). We estimate a five-variable system consisting of industrial production,  t IP, the 
personal consumption expenditures deflator, PCEt, a commodity price index,  , 
the nominal federal funds rate,  , and the M2 measure of the money stock, M2
t PCOM
t FF t. All 
data are monthly, and cover the period 959 through 2001. All variables except the federal 
funds rate are in natural logarithms. Finally, we include 12 lags of each variable in the 
VAR as well as a constant and seasonal dummy variables.  As is standard, we use a 
Choleski decomposition to orthogonalize shocks; the ordering being: IP, PCE, PCOM, 
FF, and M2.  As is standard, we take a positive, orthogonal shock to the fed funds rate as 
representing a contractionary monetary shock.   
Figure 3 presents impulse responses of the variables in the system to a (one 
standard deviation) positive shock to the fed funds rate.  The response of commodity 
prices and M2 money supply are what one might expect from a contractionary monetary 
shock--prices and the money supply fall.  After a short delay, industrial production also 
falls in response to a contractionary shock.  Only the aggregate price index, here 
measured by the personal consumption expenditures deflator, fails to react in the 
expected manner.  This so-called price puzzle has been widely noted in the literature 
(Sims (1992), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999), Barth and Ramey (2001)).  
  64.  Measuring the Response of the Cross-section distribution to Monetary Shocks 
  Because of changes in the coverage of the PPI over time, we will not use time 
series on the mean, variance, skewness and kurtosis of the cross-section distribution 
directly.  Instead, to determine how the cross-section distribution of price changes 
responds to a monetary shock, we essentially build cross-sectional response price by 
price.  For each of the 616, 8-digit level price series in the PPI we estimate an equation 
relating (the log of) the price to the macro variables present in the above VAR.  In 
particular, we estimate an equation for each of our price indices of the form: 
it t i 1 it i t i it Y ) L ( C p ) L ( B x A p ε + + + = − ,       ( 1 )  
where pit is the log of price index of good i,  xt is a vector of exogenous variables that 
includes a constant and seasonal dummy variables, and Yt is the vector of macro 
variables used in identifying monetary shocks.  Bi(L) and Ci(L) are lag polynomials.   
To calculate the response of the price of good i to a monetary shock, we simply 
append the good i price equation to the macro VAR described in the previous section.  
This structure assumes no feedback from the individual 8 digit PPI to the macro variables 
in the model or to other 8-digit-level prices.
2   To determine the effects of monetary 
policy on the cross-section distribution of prices we simply calculate the response of each 
individual price series to a monetary shock. Once we have the response of each price, we 
can build the cross-section distribution at each point in time.  We initialize the cross-
section distribution to the average (or steady state) cross-section distribution of price 
changes described in Section 2. 
                                                 
2 Barth and Ramey (2001) in their study of sectoral output and price responses to monetary shocks, and 
Davis and Haltiwanger (1997) in their study of industry level output responses to oil shocks employ similar 
restrictions. 
  7  Because the parameters of the VAR are estimated with some imprecision, we 
construct simulated distribution of impulse responses for each the 8-digit price indices in 
our sample. We do this by drawing parameters for the VAR from a normal distribution 
with a mean equal to the actual estimated parameters and variance/covariance equal to 
the parameter variance/covariance matrix.  For each parameter vector draw, we calculate 
impulse responses for the 616 price indices.  Finally, we use 1000 parameter vector draws 
to fill out the simulated distribution of impulse responses for each price.  
 
5.  Empirical Responses of 8-digit PPI Indices to Monetary Shocks 
 
  Figure 4 shows how a monetary shock affects the cross-section distribution at the 
8-digit level of disaggregation after 2, 6 and 12 months. For reference we include the 
initial or steady state (horizon 0) cross-section distribution shown in Figure 1.  Figure 5 
provides an alternative view of what is happening to the cross-section distribution by 
plotting the cumulative distributions.  What is clear from Figure 4 and 5 is that there is an 
increase in the dispersion (variance) of the cross-section distribution at these horizons as 
a result of a monetary shock.  Furthermore, at short horizons (2 and 6 months) the 
distribution of price changes is also shifted towards the right, so that more price changes 
are above their sample average than below their sample average.  Interestingly, while the 
distribution has shifted towards the right, there are still a substantial number of price 
changes that have fallen (relative to their sample average).  At a horizon of 12, the 
distribution is no longer shifted to the right with the number of price changes above their 
sample average being roughly fifty percent, but the increased dispersion remains.  After 
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has for the most part disappeared, so that the cross-section distribution at a horizon of 24 
months looks very similar to the initial cross-section distribution. 
  Changing our focus from the entire distribution to a select few moments of the 
distribution, Figure 6 shows the effect of a monetary shock on the (unweighted) mean, 
variance, skewness, and kurtosis of the cross-section distributions of price changes. 
Again, we start from the cross-section distribution implied by the sample averages of the 
individual price changes.  We also display the (unweighted) mean of the accumulated 
change in the price levels of the PPI indices.  Included on the graphs are the 10
th and 90
th 
percentiles from the Monte Carlo simulations of the impulse responses for these various 
statistics.  
Perhaps the most striking result implied by Figure 6 is the dramatic increase in the 
variance of the cross-section distribution.  Figures 4 and 5 suggest that this increase in 
dispersion is the result of some price changes increasing and others decreasing as a 
response to a monetary shock.  While the response of skewness and kurtosis displays a 
good deal of variability, the general tendency is for these statistics to fall (in absolute 
value terms) as a result of a monetary shock.  The increase in the variance and the decline 
in the skewness and kurtosis, as well as the plots of the cross-section distribution in 
Figures 4 and 5, suggest that the relative price effects of monetary shocks are widespread 
across prices and not isolated to the tails of the cross-section distribution. Note that the 
response of the mean of the cross-section distribution is qualitatively similar to that of the 
personal consumption deflator.  This suggests that the so-called “price puzzle” that is 
found in aggregate price indexes is present at the level of individual prices as well.    
  9  Another way of characterizing the response of the cross-section distribution to a 
monetary shock is to examine the cumulative responses of the individual prices at 
different horizons. Figure 7 shows the cumulative responses (or changes from the initial 
steady state cross section distribution) of the individual prices at horizons of 1, 2, 6, 12, 
24 and 60 months. As a reference point, we show the histogram for the cumulative 
response before the shock (horizon 0), which, of course, has all of the mass concentrated 
at zero.  Examining the series of panels in the Figure, we observe how a monetary shock 
propagates through the cross section distribution over time.  The initial increase in 
dispersion over the first year or so following the shock is readily apparent, and then with 
the passage of more time the distribution moves towards to the (lower) long-run price 
level. In terms of the cumulated changes this is reflected in a concentration of the mass 
on a new point below zero which is determined by the size of the (contractionary) 
monetary shock.   
To further assess whether the increase in the variance of the cross-section 
distribution of price changes is the result of a few large price changes or is the result of 
widespread relative price changes, we simply count the number of prices whose response 
to a monetary shock is positive and negative for different horizons.  To evaluate whether 
these changes are statistically “large”, we consider two alternative ways to evaluate the 
statistical significance.  The first counts the number of prices whose mean of the 
simulated distribution of responses is positive (or negative) at the 90% confidence level.
3  
The second way we examine statistical significance is more stringent.  Here we classify 
the response of a price to be positive (negative) if 90% of the simulated responses are 
                                                 
3  Thus, a price is classified as having a positive response, if we can reject  (one-sided) the null that the 
response is less than or equal to zero with a p-value of 10 percent.  
  10positive (negative).  Note that if the true probability of a positive simulated price 
response is .5 (i.e., on average the response is zero) then with 1000 simulations the 
probability that 90% of the simulated responses are positive is essentially zero.
4
  Figure 8 plots the number of prices whose mean price change and mean 
accumulated price change is positive (negative) at the 90% confidence level.  For short 
horizons (say less than twelve months), the proportion of prices rising is slightly higher 
than the proportion of prices falling.   As the horizon lengthens, the proportion of 
negative price responses is greater than positive responses.  This is particularly true for 
the accumulated price effect or price level effect as the number of prices whose mean 
response is negative gradually rises as the horizon lengthens, approaching 75 percent as 
the horizon nears five years.   
Figure 9 plots the number of prices whose response is positive (negative) using 
the more stringent definition of significant response, that is 90 percent of the simulated 
responses were positive (or negative).  Again, at short horizons slightly more prices have 
a positive accumulated response than have a negative response.  As the horizon 
lengthens, the proportion of goods whose accumulated price response is “negative” is 
substantially greater than the number of prices whose response is positive.     
These results suggest that relative price movements are widespread and that at 
short horizons a substantial number of prices are moving in opposite directions.  As we 
will discuss below, the fact that a substantial number of prices are rising while others are 
falling in response to a monetary shock poses problems for standard macro-models in 
which monetary shocks have relative price implications.  At longer horizons, a greater 
proportion of goods prices respond as one might expect them to in response to a 
                                                 
4   It is 6.7e
-162. 
  11contractionary monetary shock--they fall.  These are suggestive that relative price effects 
of a monetary shock are lessened as the horizon lengthens.  
 
6.  Price responses by stage of processing and commodity group 
  To determine whether certain types of prices are more likely to respond positively 
(or negatively) to a monetary shock, we organize the 8 digit prices into different 
categories.  First, we examine whether there are differences in the price response 
depending where the good is placed in the stage of processing, i.e. whether a good is 
classified as a finished, intermediate, or crude good.  Of the 616 prices included in our 
analysis, the BLS classifies 508 of these prices into a stage of processing.  For example, 
“Lemons” (fresh fruit) happen to be classified as a finished good as are “Beds, including 
bunk and water beds” (household furniture) and “Radio communication, fiber optics, and 
related equipment” (Communication and related equipment).  Goods like “Confectionary 
materials-corn sweeteners” and “Softwood plywood-Southern, Sanded” were classified 
as intermediate goods.  Goods like “Hard red winter wheat”,  “Douglas fir logs, bolts and 
timber”, and “Gravel, construction” were classified as crude materials. Second, we 
classify goods by their 2-digit commodity grouping.  For example, the PPI for “Lemons” 
(8-digit code 01110104) is classified as a “Farm Product” (2-digit code 01).  This yields 
fifteen different commodity groups.   
  Figure 10 displays the proportion of prices classified by stage of processing 
whose simulated mean accumulated price response is significantly positive or negative 
while Figure 11 displays the proportion of prices in which 90% of the simulated 
accumulated responses were either positive or negative.   Figures 10 and 11 suggest that 
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some prices rise and others fall) for final and to a lesser extent intermediate goods than 
for crude goods.  It takes around 20 months for final goods and around 12 months for 
intermediate good before more prices have fallen than risen in response to a 
contractionary monetary shock.  For crude goods, a disproportionately larger number of 
crude goods materials are falling than are rising and this remains the case for nearly all 
horizons.  This suggests that contractionary monetary shocks are more likely to have the 
traditional effect, price falls, on crude goods prices than more processed goods in the 
short-term.   
  Table 1 displays the proportion of goods in the various commodity groupings 
whose prices are rising and falling according to the criterion that the mean (over the 
simulations) response of the price is significantly negative or positive.  In the first month 
following a positive Fed Funds rate shock, the majority of commodity groups (11 out of 
15) have more than half of their prices rising in response to the shock.  In fact only in 
commodity group six (lumber and wood products) are a majority of prices falling at all 
horizons other than the initial period (horizon zero).  However, by horizon six, in six of 
the fifteen commodity groups a majority of prices are falling.  By the twenty-fourth 
month, twelve commodity groups have a majority of their prices falling and by the fifth 
year all but one commodity group have a majority of their prices falling (and in this 
sector the number of significant price declines exceeds the number of significant price 
increases).  Fuels and related products (commodity group five), pulp, paper, and allied 
products (commodity group nine), and transportation equipment (commodity group 
  13fourteen) generally took longer than the other commodity groups before a majority of the 
prices in those groups had fallen.     
 
7.  Oil prices and Romer-Romer Monetary Policy Variables 
  Because identification of monetary shocks is not without controversy, we 
examine whether the major conclusions hold up for alternative specifications of the 
empirical model.  First, because one might argue that monetary policy responds to 
variables that we have not already included in the basic VAR, we examine whether 
controlling for oil price changes alters the apparent relative price effects of monetary 
shocks.  We do this by including the oil price variable proposed by Hamilton (1996) in 
the basic VAR and the individual price equations.
5  We still take innovations in the fed 
funds rate to represent a contractionary monetary shock.
6  Second, rather than taking 
innovations in the fed funds rate as the monetary policy indicator, we take the Romer and 
Romer ((1989) and (1994)) dates to correspond to a contractionary monetary 
intervention.
7  A contractionary monetary shock is then the effect of the Romer-Romer 
dummy “turning on”.
8
Figure 12 displays for the model that includes the Hamilton oil price variable the 
proportions of prices whose mean response to a contractionary monetary shock is 
significantly positive or significantly negative.  Comparing Figure 12 with Figure 8 it is 
clear that including oil prices into the VAR does not change qualitatively the previous 
results—monetary shocks have strong relative effects even to the extent that some prices 
                                                 
5 The Hamilton oil price variable is defined as max(0,log(poilt)-max(log(poilt-1),…,log(poilt-12)). 
6 The oil price variable enters into the Choleski ordering before the Federal Funds Rate. 
7 The Romer dates are: 1947:10, 1955:9, 1968:12, 1974:4, 1978:8, 1979:10, and 1988:12.  
8 We include current and 12 lags of the Romer dummies in the every equation. 
  14rise and others fall.  Similarly, using the Romer dummies to capture contractionary 
monetary shocks does not change qualitatively the previous results (see Figure 13).  
 
8. What can explain the Relative Price Effects of Monetary Shocks? 
What kinds of economic environments could generate such profound relative 
price changes seen above?  If money was neutral, then there would be no relative price 
effects of a monetary shock and only the mean of the cross-section distribution of price 
changes would be affected—all prices would increase proportionally.  This is the 
prediction of a multi-sector flexible price classical model (see for example Balke and 
Wynne (2000)).  To the extent that the cross-section distribution changes dramatically, as 
evident in the changes in the dispersion (variance) of the cross-section distribution seen 
above, this suggests that monetary shocks display substantial non-neutralities even at 
high levels of disaggregation.  In this section, we consider three standard macro models 
in which monetary shocks have relative price implications.  We argue that the absence of 
rich microeconomic interactions in these standard models makes them incapable of 
generating the type of relative price effects of monetary shocks documented above.   
 
8.1  Nominal Misperceptions Model 
In the nominal misperceptions model, firms (and consumers) cannot perfectly 
distinguish between relative price changes and aggregate price (see Lucas (1972) and 
1973)).   Here we use the model similar to that proposed by Barro (1976) and examined 
for its relative price effects by Hercowitz (1982). 
  Supply of and demand for market z’s (log) output is given by:  
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where yt(z) is log output in market z, Pt(z) is (log) price in market z,   is 
expected aggregate price level given information in market z at time t, M
)) t , z ( | P ( E t Ω
t is log money 
supply, vt is an aggregate supply shock, and   and   are market z supply and 
demand shocks.  Because economic agents do not observe either the aggregate price level 
or the aggregate money supply directly, they must try to infer expected aggregate price 
level from observations of the price in their own market.  Solving the signal extraction 
problem, Hercowitz (1982) shows the equilibrium price in market z is given by 
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is the mean of   over all markets.    ) z ( λ
Because   varies across markets, equation (3) does imply that monetary 
shocks will have relative price effects.  However, because 
) z ( θ
) z ( θ  is positive for every 
market, a monetary shock causes all prices to move in the same direction—relative price 
movements occur because some prices move more than others.  This is in contrast to our 
empirical results in which we found the monetary shocks result in some prices falling and 
  16other prices rising, at least at short horizons.
9  
 
8.2 Sticky prices and Sticky information 
The next two models build on the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) model of monopolistically 
competitive price setting.  The first model assumes that prices are not fully flexible.  As a 
result, nominal prices do not increase proportionally to an increase in the money supply.  
There is a large literature on sticky prices; we consider a simple variant of the Calvo 
(1983) price setting model.  In the second model, while prices are free to move each and 
every period, they do not always do so because new information about the economic 
environment arrives (or is processed) incompletely (see Sims (2003)).  These so-called 
sticky information models have been suggested to yield more plausible dynamic behavior 
that the traditional Calvo-type sticky price model (see Woodford (2003) and Mankiw and 
Reis (2002)).   
For both classes of models, the monopolistically competitive desired price is just 
a market-up over marginal cost.  Assuming a CES aggregator for goods in the utility 
function and constant returns to scale production function with labor as the sole input, in 
equilibrium, firm i’s desired (log) price is given by: 
t , i t t t , i z y p p + η + = ,          ( 5 )  
where   is the (log) of firm i’s price, p t , i p t is the aggregate (average) price level, yt is 
aggregate output, and zi,t demand shock (a mark-up shock, say).
 10  Given real money 
demand of  , we can rewrite desired price in market i as:  t t t y p m = −
                                                 
9 Hercowitz (1982), on the other hand, did not find a statistically significant relationship between monetary 
shocks and price dispersion (variance of cross-section distribution).    
10 This discussion draws on Chapter 6 in Romer’s (2001) textbook. 
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Note that a monetary shock, keeping aggregate price level fixed, will affect all desired 
prices in the same direction.  If prices are perfectly flexible, normalizing the full 
information equilibrium output to be zero (yt = 0 and ∑ =
i
it 0 z  ) yields an aggregate 
price level of   .  Thus, for flexible prices and full information, all desired (and 
actual) prices move one-for-one with money shocks—there are no relative price effects. 
t t m p =
 
8.2.1  Calvo-type sticky price model 
We take as our benchmark sticky price model a variant of the model developed by 
Calvo (1983) that has become a workhorse in the sticky price literature. Assume that each 
month some fraction of firms get to reset the price of their output, while the remainder 
leave prices unchanged at previous levels. Let  ) 1 ( ψ −  denote the probability that a firm 
will change its price in a given time period. This probability will also denote the fraction 
of firms that change prices each period while ψ  will denote the fraction of firms that 
leave their price unchanged. Under this pricing regime, the average duration of a price set 
by a firm is  .   ) 1 /( ψ − ψ
  We assume that firms incur a quadratic cost by having a preset price that deviates 
from the price that would be chosen if it were free to adjust prices every period. If a firm 
gets to change its price at date t, it chooses a fixed price  t , i p to minimize 
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  18where β denotes the discount factor and   is the price that would be chosen in the 
absence of constraints on the frequency of price changes (equation (6) above).  The 
optimal price 
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If firm changes its price in the current period it set its price equal to  t , i p , otherwise its 
price is  .    1 t , i p −
  This model implies that monetary shocks will have relative price effects.  A 
monetary contraction will result in relative price changes as some firms change their 
price and others do not.  However, those prices that are changing are moving in the same 
direction as desired prices are all moving in the same direction (see equation (6)) in 
response to a monetary shock.  This contrasts with our empirical results above.    
 
8.2.2  Sticky information model 
  The so-called sticky information models starts from the premise that it is difficult 
(or costly) for agents to gather and process information needed to make fully informed 
decisions (see for example, Sims (2003)).  Woodford (2003), Mankiw and Reis (2002) 
have argued that sticky information models yield more plausible aggregate price 
dynamics than the Calvo-type sticky price model.  In the context of our analysis, we take 
as a representative sticky information model a model similar to that of Mankiw and Reis 
(2002).   
  19In every period, firms are free to set their price equal to the “optimal” price given 
the information they have available.  However, because of frictions in gathering and 
processing information, firms do not always have up-to-date information.  Firms are 
assumed to update their information in any given time period with a (exogenous) 
probability,  .  Thus, the proportion of firms with up-to-date information is  .  
These firms set their price equal to   (again given by equation (6)).  Firms that have an 
information set of vintage k set their price equal to  .   
λ − 1 λ − 1
*
t , i p
*
t , i k t p E
−
Again, a monetary shock will affect the desired price of all firms who have 
updated their information in the same way.  Relative price movements occur because 
only a fraction of firms have updated information.  However, as all prices changes are 
occurring in the same direction, the relative price movements are not like those we 
observed in our empirical analysis. 
  
8.3  Monetary shocks and the desired price 
  None of the three models described above can capture the kind of quantitative 
movements in relative prices we see in the data.  The reason is that in all three models a 
monetary shock moves desired prices in the same direction.  That close to half of the 
prices in our data rise in response to a contractionary monetary shock is a puzzle that 
none of these models can adequately account for.   
One interpretation of these results suggests that the source of the relative price 
movements may in fact be deeper than the fact that some prices can move more 
frequently than can others—richer microeconomic structure is need.  Perhaps, allowing 
for supply and demand complementarities between goods (in addition to substitutes in 
  20Hercowitz model) might yield richer relative price movements.  Input/output 
relationships between sectors and the distinction between final use as consumption or as 
investment may lead to richer relative price relationships.  For example, in a multi-sector 
model characterized by input/output relationships, Balke and Nath (2003) show a positive 
technology shock in capital goods producing sector can look like a demand shifts in other 
sectors--price and output rise-- while shocks to intermediate goods sectors look more like 
supply shocks—price falls and output rises.   
That a substantial number of the 8-digit PPI prices rise in the short-run in 
response to a contractionary monetary shock is likely related to the price puzzle that has 
been identified in the literature (Sims (1992)).  Ramey and Barth (2001) have suggested 
that because of financial market frictions (for example limited participation models) a 
contractionary monetary shock acts like a cost shock.  Firms, who must borrow working 
capital, see their costs rise as interest rates rise and these in turn result in an increase in 
prices.  However, to get some prices to rise and others to fall, markets (or firms) must 
differ to the extent to which financial market friction bind.  Perhaps, combining 
heterogeneity in financial market frictions with an input-output structure may yield 




  In this paper we characterize the response of over 600 8-digit producer price 
indices to monetary shocks as identified in a standard VAR framework.  We found that 
monetary shocks have substantial relative price effects.  In fact, in the short-run, nearly 
  21equal proportions of goods prices show a significant increase as show a significant 
decrease in response to a contractionary shock. This type of relative price movement is 
very difficult for standard “macro” models of relative price movements to capture. Most 
existing models of short run monetary non neutralities that make detailed predictions 
about the movements of individual prices in response to nominal shocks have all prices 
moving in the same direction as the shock. Relative price movements are generated by 
having some prices move more than others. The results reported above suggest that these 
models are incapable of replicating a key feature of the data. Our findings complement 
the earlier findings of Bils, Klenow and Kryvtsov (2003) for components of the CPI and 
pose an important challenge for models of short run monetary nonneutrality. 
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  24Table 1. 
Panel A:  Proportion of Prices Whose Mean Response is Significantly Negative 




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11  12  13  14  15 
0  0.59 0.44 0.33 0.25 0.00 0.49 0.39 0.43 0.29 0.34 0.38 0.40 0.33 0.67 0.53 
1  0.41 0.44 0.40 0.25 0.00 0.43 0.43 0.57 0.25 0.42 0.36 0.35 0.24 0.33 0.53 
6  0.55 0.51 0.50 1.00 0.20 0.38 0.35 0.49 0.27 0.45 0.39 0.31 0.43 0.44 0.42 
12  0.77 0.46 0.47 0.50 0.20 0.62 0.43 0.69 0.33 0.50 0.45 0.45 0.57 0.44 0.37 
24  0.55 0.54 0.53 0.75 0.00 0.66 0.57 0.74 0.42 0.66 0.60 0.53 0.57 0.11 0.63 
36  0.55 0.65 0.65 0.75 0.40 0.79 0.74 0.77 0.65 0.75 0.72 0.65 0.71 0.44 0.42 




Panel B:  Proportion of Prices Whose Mean Response is Significantly Positive 




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11  12  13  14  15 
0  0.41 0.53 0.62 0.75 0.80 0.47 0.57 0.49 0.69 0.63 0.59 0.55 0.57 0.11 0.47 
1  0.50 0.51 0.57 0.50 1.00 0.53 0.48 0.40 0.71 0.54 0.60 0.60 0.76 0.67 0.47 
6  0.41 0.49 0.47 0.00 0.80 0.57 0.61 0.46 0.67 0.52 0.56 0.65 0.52 0.44 0.58 
12  0.23 0.51 0.50 0.25 0.80 0.36 0.57 0.29 0.62 0.47 0.52 0.47 0.43 0.56 0.58 
24  0.36 0.44 0.40 0.25 0.80 0.30 0.39 0.17 0.54 0.30 0.38 0.47 0.33 0.89 0.42 
36  0.41 0.28 0.28 0.25 0.40 0.21 0.26 0.20 0.31 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.29 0.44 0.58 
60  0.32 0.14 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.17 0.14 0.33 0.29 0.13 0.16 0.05 0.22 0.16 
 
Notes:  Panel A (Panel B) is proportion of prices that can reject one-sided null hypothesis that mean 
response is positive (negative) with a p-value of  10%. 
Commodity groups (with number of prices in commodity group in our sample): 
1.  Farm Products (22).   
2.  Processed foods and feeds (57).   
3.  Textile products and apparel (40).   
4.  Hides, skins, leather, and related products (4).   
5.  Fuels and related products and power (5).   
6.  Chemicals and allied products (47).   
7.  Rubber and plastic products (23).   
8.  Lumber and wood products (35).   
9.  Pulp, paper, and allied products (48).   
10.  Metals and metal products (110).   
11.  Machinery and equipment (114).   
12.  Furniture and household durables (62).   
13.  Nonmetallic mineral products (21).   
14.  Transportation equipment (9).   
15.  Miscellaneous products (19). 
  25Figure 1 
Average cross-section distribution of price changes












  26Figure 2. 
Time series of selected moments of the cross-section distribution of price changes 
unweighted mean






































  27Figure 3.   
Response of Output, Prices, Commodity Prices, M2 Money Supply, and Fed Fund Rate to a Contractionary Monetary Shock 
response of IP














































Response of Cross-section Distribution to a Monetary Shock 
 
Cross-section distribution at various horizons


















Response of Cross-section Cumulative Distribution to a Monetary Shock 
 
Cross-section cumulative distribution at various horizons













  29Figure 6. 




Response of unweighted mean price change
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  30Figure 7 
Histograms of accumulated price changes at various horizons 
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  31Figure 8. 
Proportion of goods whose mean response is significantly positive or negative 
Prop. of significant mean price changes








Prop. of significant accumulated mean price changes









  32Figure 9 
Proportion of goods in which over 90% of simulated responses were positive or negative 
 
Prop. of significant price changes








Prop. of significant accumulated price changes








  33Figure 10. 
Proportion of goods by stage of processing whose mean response is significantly positive 
or negative 
Prop. of significant accumulated final goods prices changes
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34  Figure 11. 
Proportion of goods prices by stage of processing in which at least 90% of simulated 
responses are positive or negative 
 
Proportion of significant accumulated final goods prices changes
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35  Figure 12 
 Proportion of goods whose mean response is significantly positive or negative for the 
model that includes oil price variable in system 
Proportion of significant mean price changes
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36  Figure 13 
Proportion of goods whose mean response is significant for model in which monetary 
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